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Abstract This paper proposes a new method for power
transmission risk assessment considering historical failure
statistics of transmission systems and operation failure
risks of system components. Component failure risks are
integrated into the new method based on operational con-
dition assessment of components using the support vector
data description (SVDD) approach. The traditional outage
probability model of transmission lines has been modified
to build a new framework for power transmission system
risk assessment. The proposed SVDD approach can pro-
vide a suitable mechanism to map component assessment
grades to failure risks based on probabilistic behaviors of
power system failures. Under the new method, both up-to-
date component failure risks and traditional system risk
indices can be processed with the proposed outage model.
As a result, component failure probabilities are not only
related to historical statistic data but also operational data
of components, and derived risk indices can reflect current
operational conditions of components. In simulation stud-
ies, the SVDD approach is employed to evaluate compo-
nent conditions and link such conditions to failure rates
using up-to-date component operational data, including
both on-line and off-line data of components. The IEEE
24-bus RTS-1979 system is used to demonstrate that
component operational conditions can greatly affect the
overall transmission system failure risks.
Keywords Risk assessment, Component failure risk,
Outage probability, Condition assessment, Support vector
data description
1 Introduction
With the continuous increase of energy demand, the
accurate risk assessment of power systems is of great
importance, since risks are increased when a power system
is operated close to its stability limits due to distributed
generation and market competition. With regard to power
system assessment, higher risks lead to lower reliability,
and vice versa. The probabilistic behaviors of power sys-
tem failures are the root origin of risks [1], and an effective
risk assessment model can provide quantitative risk indices
to represent system reliability. Traditionally, only historical
failure statistics are employed in power system risk
assessment, however the overall system risk is also related
to component operational conditions. When component
failure risks change, the overall system risk varies
accordingly. Incorporating component risks into the power
system risk assessment can improve the accuracy and
rationality of risk evaluations.
In the past decade, considerable efforts have been
devoted to probabilistic risk assessment of power trans-
mission systems and substation configurations. A widely
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used framework for power system risk assessment was
reported in [1, 2], in which the approach, objective,
application and economic cost were discussed in detail [3].
However, in this traditional framework, failure risks of
components, such as transformers and circuit breakers,
were not considered. Generally, the risk assessment of
components in substations was performed separately [4–6].
As a result, there is a lack of a mechanism to convert
component operational conditions into failure risks in the
traditional framework. In [4], a risk assessment model of a
combinative system in a transmission network and sub-
stations was proposed. Compared with the traditional
framework, in which system risks of transmission networks
and substation configurations are assessed separately, the
method presented in [4] can evaluate system risks consid-
ering both transmission networks and substations by
assessing new load curtailments at load points for each
failure state. As an improvement, substations are no longer
treated as a transmission node and substation configura-
tions, and individual components, such as breakers and
transformers, are linked to system risks by analyzing sta-
tistical data of substation components. However, compo-
nent failure data are still based on historical statistics.
Consequently, the impact of online component operational
conditions cannot be integrated in risk evaluations.
A multi-objective risk assessment framework was pre-
sented in [7], and probabilistic indices for assessing real-
time power system security levels were derived. However,
operation risks of components were still not considered. A
failure probability model was developed based on the
evidential reasoning (ER) theory for overhead lines in [8],
which can accurately reflect the impact of surroundings on
failure probabilities. However, component outage rates
were set as a fixed value, which was not linked to opera-
tional conditions of components. Based on the ER theory
and the functional group decomposition principle, a con-
tingency identification method for components was pre-
sented in [9].
However, in that research, component conditions, such as
operational conditions and monitoring data, were not con-
sidered, and components were just treated as part of trans-
mission lines. But actually, each component has its own
failure risk, which is influenced by its operational condition. In
practice, component condition assessment is usually con-
ducted by experts or trained on-site engineers. As operational
conditions could be affected by faults or environment, such as
loading conditions and temperatures [5, 6], the failure prob-
ability of components is not fixed. Thus, the outage probability
of transmission lines changes accordingly. As the component
failure probability changes, the results of risk assessment are
not fixed values as those of traditional risk assessment models
[1], which should be determined by both operational condi-
tions and historical data.
The support vector data description (SVDD) approach is
developed for classification and evaluation with machine
learning, which can be employed to aggregate diagnosis
information [10, 11]. In particular, regarding the probabi-
listic and uncertain behaviors of component failures,
SVDD is a suitable solution for presenting evaluation of
various failure conditions. Based on the outputs of SVDD
component evaluation, system operators can obtain overall
evaluations of studied components, which can be classified
into different condition levels accordingly. The SVDD
approach is capable of providing the most recent condition
for components in power transmission systems. The
objective of this paper is to develop a new risk assessment
method for power transmission systems, in which compo-
nent conditions are considered based on on-line and off-
line data. The method comprises of three parts: component
evaluation, index transition and system risk evaluation. The
proposed method employs SVDD for component risk
assessment and the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation [1] for
system state selections.
2 SVDD approach to component condition assessment
The SVDD approach is an one-class classification data
description method which proposed by Tax [10]. By
training with a set of certain samples, the distribution of
target class can be obtained by SVDD, so the outliers can
be divided. The SVDD approach can provide well distri-
bution area and can be used in condition detection, fault
diagnosis and multi-classification, etc. [12–14].
By applying SVDD approach to mechanical condition
monitoring and fault diagnosis, machine conditions can be
monitored only by using normal condition signals instead
of abnormal condition signals. With the method, the
machine set conditions (normal or abnormal) can be
described by using quantitative indices, and the scientific
decision-making basis for equipment management and
predictive maintenance can be offered. The method is used
to evaluate the condition of the key equipment in power
transmission lines, and it correctly evaluates an abnormal
condition of the equipment in time and contributes to a
successful diagnosis of the incipient fault of a bolt
crack.
As a data set containing N data objects: {xi, i = 1, 2,…,
N}, the basic concept of SVDD is trying to find a sphere
with minimum volume, containing all (or most of) the data
objects [10]. This is very sensitive to the most outlying
object in the target data set. When one or a few very remote
objects are in the training set, a very large sphere is obtained
which will not represent the data very well. Therefore, [15]
considered some data points outside the sphere and intro-
duced slack variable ni(ni C 0, i = 1, 2, …, n). Of the
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½uðxiÞ  a½uðxiÞ  aT R2 þ ni
ni  0; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n
(
; ð1Þ
where the variable C gives the trade-off between the sim-
plicity (or volume of the sphere) and the number of errors
(number of target objects rejected); the function u is a
nonlinear mapping function used for mapping objects into
the high dimensional.
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where K(xi  xj) is the kernel function which satisfies
Mercer’s theorem:
K xi  xj
  ¼ uðxiÞ  uðxjÞ
 
: ð3Þ
The kernel function implicitly maps the objects xi into
some feature space and when a suitable feature space is
chosen, a better and more tight description can be obtained.
No explicit mapping is required, the problem is expressed
completely in terms of K(xi  xj).
Finally, parameter ai can be obtained, and xi satisfies
ai [ 0, called the support vector. From the basic concept
and definition of SVDD [11], the equation is obtained as
follows:
R2 ¼K xk  xkð Þ  2
X
i¼1




aiajK xi  xj
  8xk 2 SV \C; ð4Þ
where R2 is the distance to the center of the sphere (a); SV
means support vector.
Based on (4), each support vector can provide the value
of R2. For the test sample z, assuming that:







aiajK xi  xj
 
i; j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n: ð5Þ
If D(a, z) B R2, then z is considered as the target,
otherwise is considered as the outlier.
For illustration purposes, we define evaluation level as
the SVDD result of each component. It corresponds to the
relationships between component condition characteristic
values and failure probability. For example, based on a
transformer dissolved gas analysis (DGA) value, the SVDD
evaluation level of this component is graded as ‘good’,
‘normal’, ‘poor’ or ‘serious’. Therefore, each level equals
an area of failure rate (from 0 to 1), afterwards, the com-
ponent condition is considered in power transmission risk
assessment.
3 Power transmission system risk evaluation
considering component risks
In practice, power system risk assessment is concerned
with two aspects: i.e., system adequacy and system security
[1]. System adequacy mainly relates to the existence of
sufficient facilities within a system to satisfy consumer
load demands and system operational constraints, while
system security relates to the ability of a system to respond
to dynamic and transient disturbances arising within the
system. Thus, security is associated with the response of a

















Fig. 1 Procedure of power transmission risk assessment
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carried out by utilities are in the domain of adequacy
assessment [1], in this paper the system adequacy analysis
is set as the risk assessment objective.
The basic procedure of power transmission system risk
assessment is shown in Fig. 1 [1]. Firstly, a system sate is
selected based on historical failure statistics. Then, the
contingency analysis and optimal power flow (OPF)
method are performed to identify whether a selected state
causes any problems. Finally, risk indices are calculated. In
this paper, procedures of outage modeling in system state
selections have been modified using the updated outage
model considering component failure risks.
3.1 Traditional component failure models
Traditionally, for power transmission system risk eval-
uation, only failures of transmission components are con-
sidered, whereas generating units are assumed to be 100%
reliable. Key transmission components include overhead
lines, cables, transformers, capacitors, and reactors. Gen-
erally, these components are represented by a two-state (up
and down) model. Figure 2 shows the diagram of a basic
two-state repairable forced outage, which can be used to
describe a typical steady up-down-up cycle process.
The average unavailability of a transmission line in a
long-term process is defined as follows [1]:
Pline ¼ klinekline þ lline
; ð6Þ









where Pline is the outage probability of lines; kline and
llineare the line failure and repair rates (1/year), respec-
tively; MTTRline and MTTFline are the mean time to repair
(MTTR) (hours per year) and mean time to failure (MTTF)
(hours/year) of lines, respectively.
The historical data are recorded over a one year period
and subsequently the failure and repair rates can be derived
based on MTTF and MTTR, respectively.
3.2 Outage model integrating component failure risk
A new outage model has been developed based on
both historical failure statistics (IEEE RTS-79) [16] and
component failure risks. In the traditional outage model,
the forced outage probability of transmission lines is
denoted by Pline: Based on (1), the planned outage model
and Markov equations [1], the state space diagram con-
sidering both the line and component risks is shown in
Fig. 3.
Applying the Markov method based on the state space
diagram, the outage probabilities can be obtained as
follows:
Pci ¼ kcillinekcilline þ klinelci þ llinelci
; ð8Þ
Pup ¼ llinelcikcilline þ klinelci þ llinelci
; ð9Þ
Pline ¼ klinelcikcilline þ klinelci þ llinelci
; ð10Þ









where Pup; Pline and Pci are the probabilities of the up state,
the historical line outage state and the failure risk-based
outage state of the ith component; kline and kci are the
transition rates of historical line outages and component
failure risk-based outage states; lline and lci are the
recovery (repair) rates of the historical line outage and the
component failure risk-based outage state (repairs/year);
MTTRci and MTTFci are the MTTR and MTTF of com-
ponent, respectively.
In Section 3, the condition assessment of components
based on SVDD approach is used as an example to illus-
trate the procedures for calculating component failure risks.
As discussed previously, the overall assessment of a
component can be expressed using SVDD approach as a set
of evaluation grades, and then component failure rates can
be derived in association with the SVDD evaluation
levels.
There are normally a number of components in the same
















Fig. 3 State space diagram considering both line and component
outages
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of the main components fails. As a result, the maximum
component failure risk value is selected to represent the
overall failure probability of components in the same line.
Considering failure risks of components, the transmission
line outage probability integrating both historical failure
statistics and component failure risks can be expressed in
the following (13):
Pc ¼ max Pc1; Pc2; . . .; Pcnð Þ; ð12Þ
PL ¼ Pline þ Pc ¼ klinelci þ kcillinekcilline þ klinelci þ llinelci
; ð13Þ
where PL is the overall outage probability of transmission
lines; Pc is the maximum component failure risk among n
components in the same transmission line; Pcn is the outage
probability of the nth component in the same line.
As shown in (13), it is assumed that the ith component
has the maximum failure risk.
3.3 Load curve models and contingency analysis
In this paper, for the state enumeration or state sam-
pling method (nonsequential MC simulation), a nonchro-
nological load duration curve is utilized. A single load
curve is considered and loads at all buses are scaled
proportionally to follow the shape of the given load curve.
A multiple-step model is established to represent the load
duration curve [1]. Regarding the contingency analysis on
adequacy risk assessment, the capacity balance between
the generation and the load demand is important. As a
result, the DC power-flow-based contingency analysis is
employed in this study, because it provides fast and suf-
ficiently accurate real power flows following line outages
for risk assessment, in which a large number of outage
events are considered.
3.4 Optimization models for load curtailment
When an outage causes system problems, a special OPF
model is used to reschedule generations and alleviate
constraint violations. At the same time, load curtailment
needs to be avoided if possible or the total load curtailment
is required to be minimized if unavoidable. The objective
function of an OPF model is to minimize the total load
curtailment, whereas load curtailment at buses is the solu-
tion of the OPF model. The risk indices are then calculated
based on load curtailments in selected system outage states
and their probabilities of occurrence. To reduce the com-
putational burden, the DC power-flow-based OPF model is
usually employed in the adequacy risk assessment [1]. It
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where i is the bus number; Ci is the load curtailment at the ith
bus; TðSÞ is the real power flow vector in the outage state; AðSÞ
is the relation matrix between real power flows and power
injections in the outage state S; PG and PD are the generation
output and load power vectors, respectively; C is the load
curtailment vector; PGi, PDi, Ci and Tk(S) are the elements of
PG, PD, C and T(S), respectively; the subscript ‘‘min’’, ‘‘max’’
are the limits, respectively; NG, ND and L are the sets of
generation buses, load buses and branch circuits in a system.
The objective of the model is to minimize the total load
curtailment while satisfying the power balance, DC power flow
relationships and limits on line flows and generation outputs.
3.5 Risk indices
There are various risk indices, which are used for
quantifying system risks. In practice, loss-of-load proba-
bility (LOLP) and expected demand not supplied (EDNS)
are two most popular indices, which are employed in this
research. LOLP indicates the probability of load loss
caused by element capacity shortage (1/year). It can be





where P(x) is the probability of system state x; IfðxÞ
is a two valued function of system state x. If x
Table 1 Evaluation level corresponding to failure rate





Table 2 Results of SVDD classification
Actual/evaluation Good Normal Poor Serious Total
Good 39 7 4 0 50
Normal 5 42 2 1 50
Poor 0 1 26 3 30
Serious 0 2 1 27 30
Total 44 51 35 130
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indicates the failure state, then If is equal to 1,
otherwise 0.






where LCðxÞ represents the minimum load loss for recovery
in the outage state x.
4 Case study
4.1 Component failure risk mapping
The condition assessment of transformers is used as an
example to illustrate the procedures for calculating com-
ponent failure risks. For other components, the procedures
can be performed in a similar manner. As discussed pre-
viously, the overall assessment of a component can be
expressed as a set of evaluation grades, then component
failure rates can be derived in association with the SVDD
evaluation levels. For illustration purposes, Table 1 lists
the corresponding relationships between evaluation levels
and failure rates. For example, based on historical statistics
or operation experience, the failure rate of a component is
0.14 per year, and then the SVDD evaluation level of this
component is graded as ‘good’.
Table 1 only gives reference values for illustration pur-
poses, and in practice, this table may be modified based on
operation situations and historical statistics analysis. It is
defined that the SVDD evaluation grade, that is ‘serious’,
‘poor’, ‘normal’ or ‘good’, with the maximum value is
treated as the final evaluation grade of a component. Using
this mapping table, the failure rate kc can be derived by the




































Fig. 4 IEEE RTS-79 test system
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be defined similarly. In the meantime, kline and lline can be
derived from historical statistic data, and finally the outage
probability of components can be calculated by using (8).
4.2 SVDD-based component failure risk evaluation
In this paper, 260 sets of transformer monitoring data
sample are adopted. These samples are acquired from the
DGA monitoring of transformers. Thereinto, 130 sets are
used for training (50 sets are in good condition, 50 sets are
normal, 30 set are poor and 30 sets are serious) and others
are used for testing. By adopting the SVDD approach, the
evaluation results are listed in Table 2.
In the evaluation results, the total accuracy is about
84%. The accuracy of ‘good’, ‘normal’, ‘poor’ and ‘seri-
ous’ are 78%, 84%, 87% and 90%, respectively.
Based on the mapping relations listed in Table 1, the
failure rate of a component can be generated randomly
between the areas. However, the mapping relation is only
for illustrating reference values, those values can be
defined based on the practice or experience.
4.3 System risk assessment: Case I
In this case study, the IEEE RTS-79 system is employed
as the test system [15] as shown in Fig. 4. In the IEEE RTS-
79 test system, the load model gives hourly loads for one year
on a per unit basis, expressed in chronological fashion so that
daily, weekly and seasonal patterns can be modeled. The
generating system contains 32 units, ranging from 12 to
400 MW. The transmission system contains 24 load/gener-
ation buses connected by 38 lines or autotransformers at two
voltage levels, i.e. 138 kV and 230 kV. The transmission
system includes cables, lines on a common right of way, and
lines on a common tower. The transmission system data
include the line length, impedance, ratings, and reliability
data.
In MC simulations different sampling frequencies lead
to different convergences, therefore the sampling fre-
quencies of the MC simulation are set with different val-
ues. As a result, the derived risk index values at different
sampling frequencies are presented in Table 3.
It is assumed that all the transformers in the system are
operated under a ‘normal’ condition, and the component
failure rates are set as a random value between 0.2 and 0.8
randomly according to Table 1.
Compared with the results without considering compo-
nent risks the LOLP and EDNS have rarely increased.
4.4 System risk assessment: Case II
In Case II, the component failure rates are set higher
than that of Case I and all system components are assumed
to be operated under a ‘poor’ condition. The component
failure risks are generated between 0.8 and 1.0 mapping to
the ‘poor’ level for each line. Different sampling fre-
quencies are also compared, as shown in Table 4.
In Case II, it is clear that when evaluation levels of all
transformers are changed from ‘normal’ to a worse level
like ‘poor’, LOLP increases significantly. Compared with
these of Case I, LOLP considering component risks
increases nearly by 15%, while ENDS considering com-
ponents is raised by 6%.
4.5 System risk assessment: Case III
In this case, only the component between BUS 3 and BUS
24 is set as outage, while other components in the system are
considered as ‘normal’. According to Table 1, the proba-
bility of the outage component is 100%, and failure rates of
other components are between 0 and 0.2. Different sampling
frequencies are applied and its results concerning LOLP and
ENDS are listed in Table 5. Compared with Case II, LOLP
and EDNS are 8 and 3% more than those of Case I, which
indicates that when a transformer is working under a ‘seri-
ous’ condition, the overall system risk increases. However,
the risks are less than those in Case II, which indicates that
when failure risks of several components change from
‘normal’ to a ‘poor’ or ‘serious’ grade, the risk values
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20,000 8.69 9.25 14.62 14.39
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increase much more than the situation that only one com-
ponent is in the ‘serious’ grade.
The variation convergence curves of EDNS in three
cases are illustrated in Fig. 5, which shows that when the
sampling frequency is over 20,000 times, the variation
convergence is relatively small under 0.2. It means that, for
three cases the derived coefficients are reliable when the
sampling frequency is over 20,000 times.
5 Conclusion
A new method for transmission system risk assessment
considering component monitoring data is proposed. The
proposed SVDD-based approach can provide a suitable
mechanism to map component evaluation grades to failure
risks based on the probabilistic behaviors of power system
failures. Using the new method, both up-to-date component
condition status and traditional system risk indices can be
processed with the developed outage model. In this study,
transformer DGA data have been used to calculate compo-
nent failure risks. The simulation results indicate that trans-
mission system risks are affected not only by component
operational conditions, but also by historical statistics data. In
case studies, the implementation procedures of component
risk evaluation using SVDD and system risk assessment are
demonstrated.
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